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JUDGING GLOBAL JUSTICE: ASSESSING THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
DIANE

F.

ORENTLICHER*

When Trinidad and Tobago suggested in 1989 that the
United Nations establish a permanent international criminal
court,1 its proposal seemed nothing if not quixotic. After all, proposals to create such a court had disappeared into diplomatic oblivion for roughly half a century. And so the entry into force of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court2 ("Rome
Statute") just four years after its adoption surprised even the
court's most ardent proponents. After a protracted period of gestation, the international criminal court (ICC) seemed, proverbially, to be an idea whose time had come.
Yet the court has been steeped in controversy since its statute was adopted over the strenuous objection of the United
States in July 1998.' Although largely isolated in its particular
brand of opposition to the ICC, the United States has been a
formidable (if lonely) adversary.4 It has waged pitched battles
against the court on numerous fronts, threatening, for example,
to: veto United Nations Security Council resolutions extending
the mandate of peacekeeping operations unless U.S. forces are
Professor of International Law, American University. I am grateful to Laurel
Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft and
to Rosy Lek Lor and Nirupa Narayan for excellent research assistance.
Letter dated 21 August 1989 from the Permanent Representative of Trinidad and
Tobago to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex 44, Agenda
Item 152, Supp. No. 49, at 287, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
2 Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July
17, 1998, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), as corrected by the procdsverbaux of November 10, 1998 and July 12, 1999, reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 966 (2000)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
3 See Alessandra Stanley, U.S. Dissents, but Accord Is Reached on War-Crime
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1998 (late ed.), at A3; Thomas W. Lippman, Worldwide War Crimes High Court Is Approved; Delegates Overrule U.S. Objections,
WASH. POST, July 18, 1998, at Al.
The United States was one of seven states that voted against the Rome Statute in
July 1998, but it has been almost singular in its muscular opposition to the court
in the period since then. While several other states, including Israel, remain opposed to ICC jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states, no other country has
mounted a concerted campaign to undermine the court.
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assured immunity from ICC jurisdiction,5 deny bilateral military
assistance to states that have ratified the Rome Statute, and invade ICC detention facilities in the event an American national
is ever detained there.6

In my view, the United States has raised a number of serious
and legitimate concerns. But as I will elaborate later, the U.S.

government has undermined its position by advancing its concerns through strategies that are counter-productive at best.
Unfortunately, too, U.S. opposition has tended to eclipse
other challenges surrounding the first international criminal

court in history with a potentially global remit. Yet with the ICC
now open for business, it is more important than ever to attend
to the full range of challenges surrounding its operation. And so
I would like to place U.S. concerns about the ICC in a broader

framework of questions that deserve attention at the dawning of
the ICC's operational life.7
On June 30, 2002, the United States vetoed a Security Council extension of the
U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia for six months because the Council declined to grant U.S. participants in the mission immunity from ICC jurisdiction,
but agreed to a brief extension of the mission until the impasse could be resolved.
See Serge Schmemann, U.S. Vetoes Bosnia Mission, Then Allows 3-Day Reprieve,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002 (late ed.), at A3. The United States prevailed on July 12,
2002, when the Security Council adopted a resolution generally exempting nationals of non-party states who participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations from
the jurisdiction of the ICC for a renewable twelve-month period. See S.C. Res.
1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (2002). On
June 12, 2003, the Security Council approved a one-year renewal of the exemption. Three members of the Council abstained from voting on the ground that
the exemption undermines the ICC. See Colum Lynch, U.N. Extends U.S.
Peacekeepers' Immunity: Special Exemption from War Crimes Court Draws Criticism from European Union, WASH. PosT, June 13, 2003, at A24.
6 These and other measures are authorized by the American Servicemembers' Protection Act [hereinafter ASPAJ. Section 2005(a) directs the President to use the
U.S. vote in the U.N. Security Council to ensure that any resolution authorizing a
peacekeeping operation exempt "at a minimum, members of the Armed Forces
of the United States participating in such operation from criminal prosecution or
other assertion of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court for actions undertaken by such personnel in connection with the operation." Section 2007 prohibits U.S. military assistance to "the government of a country that is a party to
the International Criminal Court," subject to various exceptions. Section 2008(a)
authorizes the President to "use all means necessary and appropriate to bring
about the release of any [US national or ally] who is being detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the International Criminal Court."
The Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, in accordance with Article
126(1) of the statute. The ICC's first panel of judges was sworn into office on
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I start with the basic proposition that we should approach
8
the ICC with a fairly clear sense of what we expect it to achieve.
More particularly, we need to identify benchmarks for assessing
its performance. How will we know if it has succeeded in its mission-and how will we know when it is falling short? Before I
proceed, let me emphasize that this essay only begins to tackle
this question, focusing on several benchmarks of success particularly pertinent in the early years of the court's work.

I.

THE ERA OF ASSESSMENT

Fortunately, in addressing these questions we no longer
write on a blank slate. We can now tap a rich reservoir of experi-

ence in clarifying our expectations of the ICC. For the new court
joins a diverse and growing repertoire of courts and other institu-

tions designed to respond to mass atrocity. Best known among
these are two tribunals created by the United Nations Security
Council in the early 1990s to prosecute individuals responsible
for "ethnic cleansing" in the former Yugoslavia and genocide in
Rwanda'; I will mention other models later.
March 11, 2003. See Marlise Simons, World Court for Crimes of War Opens In
The Hague, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 12, 2003 (late ed.), at A10. The ICC's chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, was elected on April 21, 2003. See U.N. News Centre, Countries meeting at UN elect first prosecutorfor InternationalCriminal Court
(Apr. 21, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewslD=
6806&Cr=icc&Crl= (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
8 This is not to say, however, that our expectations should be cast in iron. As the
work of the ICC progresses, our sense of what it can reasonably achieve and
contribute will doubtless evolve.
See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, adopted by S.C. Res.
827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended
by S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166
(1998); S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4240th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1329 (2000); S.C. Res. 1411, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4535th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1411 (2002); and S.C. Res. 1481, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4759th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1481 (2003) [hereinafter "ICTY Statute"]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for
Genocide and Other such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring
States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, adopted by S.C. Res. 955,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), amended by
S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3877th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1165
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For a while, it was a commonplace that legal experts most
familiar with these tribunals were hesitant publicly to criticize
flaws in their operation. 1° These experts wished the tribunals

well, and worried about undermining the new institutions at a
time when they seemed too fragile to withstand substantial criti-

cism. Today, that reticence has given way to a robust industry of
assessment, much of it critical, most of it constructively so."
A recurring theme in this emergent literature is to challenge
the canonical claims espoused by champions of global justice. To
be honest, proponents of international criminal courts and other
institutional responses to mass atrocity have left ourselves open
to this sort of challenge, for we have at times made strong claims
without providing much in the way of empirical support for our
underlying assumptions. Familiar examples include: A standing
international criminal court will be a powerful antidote to the
impunity that abets mass atrocity." Or this: By individualizing

responsibility, criminal prosecutions avoid the taint of collective

(1998); S.C. Res. 1329, supra; S.C. Res. 1411, supra; and S.C. Res. 1431, 57th
Sess., 4601st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411 (2002) [hereinafter "ICTR Statute"].
In this essay I will refer to the Yugoslavia tribunal as the ICTY, and will refer to
the Rwanda tribunal as the ICTR.
10 See Jenny S. Martinez, Troubles at the Tribunal, WASH. POST, July 3, 2001, at A19.
See, e.g., Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair:
Rethinking the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUMAN RTS. Q. 573
(2002) [hereinafter "Violence and Social Repair"]; David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and
Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 5 (Summer/Fall 2002);
Jos6 E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadi_- Judgment, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 2031 (2001) [hereinafter "Rush to Closure"]; Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of
States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999)
[hereinafter "Lessons from Rwanda"]. For critiques of canonical claims in support of truth commissions, see Audrey R. Chapman & Patrick Ball, The Truth of
Truth Commissions: Comparative Lessons from Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala, 23 HUMAN RTS. Q. 1 (2001); Michael Ignatieff, Articles of Faith, in INDEX
ON CENSORSHIP 5 (1996).
12See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Without Fanfareor Cases, InternationalCourt Sets Up,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002 (late ed.), at A3 (quoting U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan saying of the ICC, "We hope it will deter future war criminals and bring
nearer the day when no ruler, no state, no junta and no army anywhere will be
able to abuse human rights with impunity"); Remarks of Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, International Criminal Court Assembly of
State Parties (Sept. 9, 2002), available at http://hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/ken-icc
0909.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
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guilt.13 And this familiar claim was an asserted basis for two Security Council resolutions establishing war crimes tribunals for
the Balkans and Rwanda, respectively: Without justice, there can
be no lasting peace. 4 A variation on the same theme has been a

guiding principle for proponents of truth commissions: Without
truth, there can be no genuine reconciliation.15

13 See,

e.g., Annual Report of the International Tribunalfor the Prosecutionof Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 49th
Sess., Agenda Item 152, at 12, __ 16, U.N. Doc. A/49/342 (1994); Neal J. Kritz,
Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms for
Mass Violations of Human Rights, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 128 (1996)
[hereinafter "Coming to Terms with Atrocities"]; Jerry Fowler, U.S. Has
Wounded InternationalJustice, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 1998; Diane F. Orentlicher,
Judging One Person At a Time, TribunalSeeks Justice in Bosnia, L.A. TIMES, May
19, 1996 (record ed.), at M2.
4 Both the ICTY and ICTR were established by the U.N. Security Council as enforcement measures adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter with the aim
of restoring international peace and security. Security Council Resolution 827
(1993), supra note 9, which established the ICTY, included the following
preambular language:
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia
the establishment as an ad hoc measure by the Council of an international
tribunal and the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law would ... contribute to the restoration and
maintenance of peace.

Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), supra note 9, which established the
ICTR, included similar preambular language, with the additional phrase "would
contribute to the process of national reconciliation and" before "to the restoration and maintenance of peace." Similarly, a resolution of the U.N. General Assembly requesting the Secretary-General to resume negotiations with the
government of Cambodia aimed at establishing a court to prosecute those most
responsible for Khmer Rouge-era atrocities "[r]ecogniz[ed]" that criminal accountability of the perpetrators is "a key factor in ensuring .... ultimately, reconciliation and stability within a State." G.A. Res. 57/228A, U.N. GAOR, 57th
Sess., Agenda Item 109(b), pmbl, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 (2002).
15See, e.g., Alice H. Henkin, Conference Report, STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR
PARDON
TIONS

(1989), excerpted in

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: GENERAL CONSIDERA-

I, at 184, 186 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995). Claims along these lines are summa-

rized in

PRISCILLA

TERROR AND

11, at 586.

B.

HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE

ATROCITY 30-31 (2001). See also Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note
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Skeptics have challenged these and other articles of faith on

various grounds. Here are a few: There is no evidence that existing tribunals have deterred atrocious crimes; 16 in fact, those

who are inclined to commit appalling crimes are unlikely to be
deterred by the remote possibility that they will one day be
called to account before an international court.17 And this: Pro-

ponents of punishment do not understand that prosecution can
stand in the way of peace. Leaders with blood on their hands

may cling more tenaciously to power if they cannot secure an
airtight amnesty. " Another: Prosecutions (as well as truth commissions) may stir the pot of ethnic grievance rather than promote reconciliation. 9
While these views challenge the empirical assumptions un-

derlying claims in support of prosecutions,2" other critiques question basic premises of proponents' claims. Against the claim that
prosecutions avoid the taint of collective guilt, for example, Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein suggest that this may be a defect rather than virtue. In their view, prosecuting perpetrators of

mass atrocity may enable others who aided the defendants'

16 See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF

291 (2000); Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 11, at 592;
Alvarez, Rush to Closure, supra note 11, at 2080.
'7 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D. Krasner,
The Limits of Idealism,
DaeDALUS 47, 55-56 (Winter 2003).
,8For a variant of this claim, see Madeline Morris, Lacking a Leviathan: The Quandaries of Peace and Accountability, in POsT-CONFLIcr JUSTICE 135 (M. Cherif
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS

Bassiouni ed., 2002). Cf

CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL X

(1996) ("the risk of being punished for human rights violations tends to make the
leaders of authoritarian regimes reluctant to surrender power in the first place").
'9 This appears to be the prevailing view in Mozambique, which has apparently
achieved a significant measure of stability in the aftermath of brutal civil war by
agreeing not to "dig up the past." See HAYNER, supra note 15, at 186-95. Cf
Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1221, 1233 (2000) (asserting that "postgenocidal legal
initiatives can play only a small role in promoting long-term peace in Rwanda,
but can present significant impediments to the emergence of this peace").
20That is, the critiques summarized above take the form, "Proponents of prosecutions believe that trials will have X effect, but prosecutions are just as/more likely
to have Y effect."
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crimes to avoid confronting their own responsibility if criminal
trials are not accompanied by other measures of social repair. 1
These and other critiques provide a salutary invitation to
bring greater rigor to bear in assessing the contributions of international tribunals and other responses to appa!ling crimes. Particularly welcome is Fletcher's and Weinstein's call for empirical
testing of the effects of prosecutions and other mechanisms of
transitional justice.2 2 Yet some critiques suffer from the same infirmities they have faulted in the claims of tribunal proponents.
Various critiques have been flawed by internal inconsistencies as
well as by manifestly fewer inhibitions about making unsupported claims than their authors would allow proponents of prosecutions. For example, skeptics who question the deterrent
power of international tribunals on the ground that dictators are
unlikely to be constrained by the risk of prosecution seem confident that those same dictators would be deterred from relinquishing power if they faced prosecution before an international
tribunal.23
Another recurring feature of critiques of international tribunals is their reliance on short-term measures. For example, the
efficacy of the Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal has frequently
been called into question on the ground that the court has had
little discernible impact on public attitudes in the former Yugoslavia relating to war crimes.24 Yet the Yugoslavia Tribunal has

21 See

Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 11, at 580-81. But see id. at 628 (suggesting
that the record of a trial "permits unindicted perpetrators and bystanders to confront their complicity in the atrocities").
22See, e.g., id. at 584-85, 592, 595.
23See, e.g., Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 17, at 54-55.
24 See, e.g., Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 11, at 601, 603.
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not even completed its most important case to date-the Prose-

cutor v. Slobodan Milogevid.25 I do not believe that any proponent of the Tribunal's work has claimed that the court would
revolutionize opinion in the former Yugoslavia overnight.26
As has often been noted, the Nuremberg trial had little dis-

cernible effect on German public opinion right away. Instead, its
lessons apparently took root only a generation later, when Germany undertook its own prosecutions of Nazi criminals beginning in the 1960s.27 This experience reinforces what common
sense suggests: We should not be surprised to find initial resistance to the ICTY's lessons in individual responsibility among

many citizens of the former Yugoslavia - or to see a different
judgment emerge with the passage of time.
And so it is noteworthy that there are already early indica-

tions that the trial of Milogevid is having some impact on public
z Fletcher and Weinstein challenge the efficacy of the ICTY in part by citing the
views of thirty-two judges and prosecutors in Bosnia and Hercegovina whose
views, the authors say, undercut assumptions behind ICTY proponents' claims
about the contributions of prosecutions to reconciliation. See Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 11, at 580-81 & n. 20, 585 & n. 36. Leaving aside issues bearing
on the representativeness of this sample, the study reflected interviews undertaken in 1999 - the year that the ICTY indicted its symbolically most important
defendant, former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milogevid. See Initial Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milogevid et al., No. IT-02-54 (ICTY May 24,
1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii990524e.htm.
Also, the ICTY did not undertake significant efforts to educate legal professionals in the former Yugoslavia about the Tribunal's work until 1999. See Tolbert,
supra note 11, at 11. It should be noted that Fletcher and Weinstein acknowledge
in general terms the temporal limitation on their conclusions. See Fletcher &
Weinstein, supra note 11, at 585-86. See also Report: Justice, Accountability and
Social Reconstruction:An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors,13
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 102, 113 (2000) (noting limitations in the study data stemming from the "small size and non-random nature of the sample").
'6 As this observation suggests, another recurring feature in the new genre of critique is a tendency to overstate the claims asserted by proponents of prosecution.
For example, Fletcher and Weinstein say that "many trial advocates justify their
efforts under the assumption that a focus on legal processes is adequate to resolve the individual and social harm" resulting from mass atrocity. Fletcher &
Weinstein, supra note 11, at 584. While leading proponents of prosecutions place
considerable emphasis on the value of criminal trials, I am not aware of any that
would accept this characterization of his or her position. Still, the perception of
Professors Fletcher and Weinstein suggests that many advocates of prosecutions
may not be expressing clearly their view that prosecutions do not by themselves
address the multiple needs of societies that have been ravaged by mass atrocity.
27 See TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE'S GHOSTS AFrER
COMMUNISM

314 (1995).
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opinion in Serbia. Bogdan Ivanigevid, a Serbian staff member of
Human Rights Watch, has seen inklings of progress in the year
since the trial of Milogevi6 began:
Even though they have resistance to hearing non-Serb witnesses, people do take into consideration what they hear.
The trial has caused reduced myth-making in Serbia. You
don't hear, as you did prior to the trial,... that [the massacre at] Srebrenica didn't happen or that the Muslims killed
themselves. I wouldn't minimize this reduced space for rewriting history. As for acknowledgment of our side's
crimes, it's a psychological barrier too difficult [to
cross-admitting] that the policy we supported was criminal.
It will take time. It may take a new generation that was
not implicated. 8
In sum, then, the ICC will doubtless benefit from a rich and
deepening experience with evaluating the court's two most important contemporary precursors. Yet we need to make further
progress in the direction that has been charted by recent attempts to assess the contributions of international criminal tribunals and other forms of justice for mass atrocity. We must do
better not only at defining our expectations, but in testing them
through empirical assessments. More broadly, rigorous assessments are indispensable to the legitimacy of international tribunals-a point to which I will return.

II.

BENCHMARKS OF SUCCESS

By what standards, then, should we judge the ICCT 9 Some
are self-evident: Clearly, for instance, the court must scrupulously adhere to internationally-recognized standards of fair process. Bearing in mind the court's legacy, its judgments must be
able to withstand the test of historic scrutiny. A key challenge
Quoted in Gary J. Bass, Milosevic in The Hague, 82 FOREIGN AFn. 82, 94-95
(May/June 2003) (second alteration in original).
2 As noted earlier, this essay touches on only a few benchmarks for assessing the
court. This section focuses on assessment criteria that are especially relevant in
the early years of the ICC rather than on the broader aims underlying the court's

creation, such as deterring future crimes and contributing to social reconstruction
in societies ravaged by mass atrocity.
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will be to sustain the relentless scrutiny necessary to ensure consistent compliance with standards that assure the integrity of judicial process. Also, our experience with the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda tribunals leaves little doubt that the ICC will be judged
in part by its success in apprehending those whom its prosecutor
has indicted" and on its ability to complete trials efficiently.
More difficult questions of assessment-at least those I will
mention here-fall into two broad categories. The first relates to
how the prosecutor exercises his discretionary power and how
well he is constrained in the exercise of that discretion. This category covers a cluster of interrelated concerns. A key question
in this regard is how broadly the prosecutor will interpret his
mandate to prosecute only "the most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole."31 At least some
human rights advocates will press for a comparatively broad interpretation. But an interpretation that is excessively broad
would surely fan skeptics' fears of a global Kenneth Starr.
A second and central concern falling into the first category
relates to the all-important question of how the prosecutor and
judges will interpret and enforce the Rome Statute's principle of
complementarity.32 Here, too, the ICC's chief officers will be
subject to significantly different expectations from vocal constituencies. Since this issue has received considerable attention,33 I
would like to focus instead on a somewhat distinct aspect of
prosecutorial discretion that has received comparatively little attention. The question I have in mind relates to how the ICC fits
in-more particularly, how it should fit in-to the increasingly
30 Cf

Tolbert, supra note 11, at 9 (noting that more than three years after its crea-

tion, the ICTY "had only a handful of [indicted suspects] in custody ...,causing

at least one leading commentator to call for its disbandment").
31Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. The Rome Statute allows some berth here.

For example, Article 8 establishes the ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes "in particular" - rather than only - "when committed as part of a plan or policy or as
part of a large-scale commission of such crimes."
32 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl., 10; arts. 1, 17. Pursuant to this principle, the ICC may not proceed with a case that is being or has been investigated or
prosecuted by a state that has jurisdiction, unless the domestic proceedings have
been tainted by the state's inability or unwillingness to conduct a genuine inquiry
or prosecution. See id., art. 17(1)(a)-(b).
13 See, e.g., William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 66-70, 101-03 (2001); Alvarez, Lessons from Rwanda, supra note 11,
at 476-79.
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crowded landscape of institutions newly able and willing to enforce international humanitarian law.
Besides the two ad hoc tribunals I have already mentioned,
in recent years the United Nations has created and administered
a new breed of court, constructed out of national and international elements, in the post-conflict regions of Kosovo and East
Timor.' Another type of hybrid court has been established in
Sierra Leone.35 In each instance, a majority of senior court officials are "international"36 jurists appointed by the United Nations, while the rest are nationals of the country or region in
question. Each of these courts applies an amalgam of international and local law.37
Alongside international and mixed tribunals, national courts
have lately assumed growing responsibility for prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law. Many are prosecuting
crimes committed in their own territory, but the past few years
have also seen growing recourse to universal jurisdiction. This
principle, widely associated with European proceedings against
former Chilean president Augusto Pinochet, authorizes every
state to prosecute a small number of atrocious crimes, such genocide and crimes against humanity. Meanwhile, dozens of countries have established truth commissions, non-judicial bodies
established to investigate past patterns of mass atrocity, usually

'4

I describe the hybrid courts of Kosovo and East Timor in Diane F. Orentlicher,
The Future of Universal Jurisdictionin the New Architecture of TransnationalJustice, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF
SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW

214 (Stephen J. Macedo ed.,

forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter "The Future of Universal Jurisdiction"].
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established pursuant to a bilateral agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone. See id. A different type of
hybrid court may be established for Cambodia. See id.
3 This term has come to be used to refer to jurists who are not nationals of the
country in which the hybrid court operates. See, e.g., Report of the SecretaryGeneral on Khmer Rouge Trials, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item
109(b), __ 33-34, 36, 38, 44 (2003).
31See Orentlicher, The Future of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 34; Laura A.
Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003).
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during a specified period in a particular country or region." Although most truth commissions have been established at the national level, some have been established by the United Nations.39
These institutions are key components of a new architecture
of transnational justice still taking shape. The emergent system
presents new challenges as well as opportunities. In particular,
the proliferation of institutions newly able and willing to seek
justice for atrocious crimes presents a challenge that long seemed
unimaginable - the need to craft principled guidelines for choosing among a diverse range of courts empowered to bring wrongdoers to account. 4°
Although the Rome Statute provides some guidance concerning which court should have priority when more than one
venue is available, it leaves many questions unanswered. For example it is not altogether clear whether the ICC would or should
have priority over a national court exercising universal jurisdiction (as distinct from a national court prosecuting crimes committed in its territory or by its nationals). 4' Nor does the Rome
Statute tell us when it might make sense to establish new hybrid
conflict rather than
courts in countries recovering from savage
42
leave the onus of prosecution to the ICC.
Of course, these decisions will not fall solely to the ICC
prosecutor. After all, he will not have the authority to create a
The leading treatment of truth commissions is

HAYNER,

supra note 15.

9 These include commissions established in respect of El Salvador and Guatemala.
4' The outlines of some principles are already taking shape. This may seem the

antithesis of a guideline, but one principle that has already garnered wide support
is that there is no one-size-fits-all response to mass atrocity. See, e.g., Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities, supra note 13, at 152; Drumbl, supra note 19, at 1225;
Alvarez, Lessons from Rwanda, supra note 11, at 370; M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Searchingfor Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS.

9, 23 (1996). Another widely accepted insight is that criminal

prosecutions, when appropriate, hardly exhaust the needs of societies emerging
from mass atrocity. Thus, for example, truth commissions and reparations programs are rarely seen today as mutually exclusive alternatives to prosecutions.
See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 19, at 1225-26 (arguing that, in the wake of genocide, it is not necessary to "select either criminal trials or truth commissions or
amnesties" since post-genocide policies "are not mutually exclusive").
41 For analysis of this ambiguity, see Orentlicher, The Future of Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 34.
42 In respect of this last question, I find the basic concept of hybrid courts appealing

- in some respects more attractive than the prospect of prosecutions before the
ICC. By bringing justice home, mixed tribunals can contribute more effectively
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new hybrid court. But the prosecutor can and surely will play an
important role in shaping public expectations and diplomatic positions concerning the appropriate forum for prosecution.4 3 And,
of course, the prosecutor will play a key role in ICC determinations of admissibility when he wishes to proceed with an investigation over the objections of a state that seeks exclusive
jurisdiction in its courts."
While the ICC must be able to act when national systems fail
to provide justice for mass atrocity, its success will also be measured by its ability to bolster domestic judicial systems. Even the
ICTY, which does not have a mandate to provide assistance to
domestic courts in the Balkans, has been justifiably faulted for
failing to contribute to "the development of courts and justice
systems" in the former Yugoslavia, "particularly in relation to
to national processes of reckoning with mass atrocity than the remote justice dispensed in The Hague and Arusha or by national courts exercising universal jurisdiction. Also, by including national judges, prosecutors and staff, mixed tribunals
can bolster the rule of law in countries whose judicial system has been decimated.
But this view comes with a strong caveat: The potential advantages of hybrid
tribunals can be realized only if we do the job right. With the possible exception
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the new generation of mixed tribunals has
fallen short of its full potential. That said, the prosecution team in Dili has recently defied expectations by indicting senior Indonesian officials and other leading suspects in relation to the sweeping violence that surrounded the 1999
plebiscite in East Timor. See Jill Jolliffe, Wiranto Faces UN Counts Over Timor,
THE AGE (Melbourne), Feb. 26, 2003, at 12; Guido Guilart, A.P., U.N. Indicts 8
on War Crimes in E. Timor, Feb. 25, 2003; Guido Guilart, A.P., East Timor War
Crimes PanelIndicts 49, Feb. 28, 2003; Serious Crimes Unit, Information Release:
Crimes Against Humanity, Rape Charges for Five TNI Soldiers (Apr. 10, 2003).
Still, gaining jurisdiction over the indicted suspects presents a daunting challenge.
3The first chief prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, Richard Goldstone, may have
helped persuade the U.N. Security Council to link the two tribunals institutionally. Goldstone took up his post as chief prosecutor of the ICTY in August 1994.
The Security Council established the ICTR in November 1994. When creation of
the ICTR was under discussion, Goldstone took the position that linking the two
courts through a common prosecutor and appeals chamber would avoid inconsistency in the development and interpretation of legal principles.
Under the Rome Statute, the determination of admissibility is made by ICC
judges. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17. The prosecutor will, however,
play a key role in initiating investigations and countering state objections to the
admissibility of a case. No less important, he may - and at times surely will encourage states to carry out their own criminal proceedings and provide practical assistance to enable them to do so effectively. See International Criminal
Court Office of the Prosecutor, "Paper on some policy issues before the Office of
the Prosecutor," at 5 (2003).
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war crimes."45 The case for ICC assistance to domestic legal systems is even stronger. Although the ICC does not have an explicit mandate to strengthen domestic judicial systems, "such
assistance is within the spirit of the ICC Statute. 46 In contrast to
the ICTY, which has primacy over domestic trials,47 the ICC
prosecutor must defer to a state that has jurisdiction and is pursuing the crime in question, unless that state is unwilling or unable genuinely to conduct the criminal proceeding.48 While not an
explicit mandate to assist domestic prosecutors and judges, this
feature of the Rome Statute reflects a strong bias in favor of local
justice. More than that, it signifies the ICC's unique potential to
enlarge the space for domestic prosecutions by providing a credible threat of international prosecutions if domestic institutions
fall short. 49 And so a key test of the ICC's success will be the
extent to which the looming prospect of prosecution in The
Hague inspires governments to undertake credible domestic investigations and, where warranted, prosecutions.
Finally, another broad test of the ICC's success sifts down to
that all important but notoriously elusive notion of legitimacy.
We do not yet know much about how perceptions of the legitimacy of an international tribunal affect its impact. For reasons I
suggested earlier, this question deserves serious study. But it
seems reasonable to suppose that the ICC's effectiveness in deterring crimes and, perhaps, contributing to national processes of
reconciliation will turn in significant measure on perceptions of
its legitimacy."
Some of the issues I have already mentioned are surely relevant to the question of ICC legitimacy. For example, public perceptions of how responsibly the ICC prosecutor exercises his
discretionary charging power will be crucial. In addition, the
4'Tolbert, supra note 11, at 12.
46Id. at 17.
47See ICTY Statute, supra note 9, art. 9(2). See also ICTR Statute, supra note 9,

art. 8(2) (similarly establishing primacy of ICTR over national courts).
48Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 17(1)(a), 18(2).
4'Anecdotal evidence suggests that the ICC has already performed this function.
'0Perceptions of the court's legitimacy will doubtless vary among and within various political and professional communities.
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court's standing will turn in large measure on the perceived quality of judicial rulings and the reasoning provided in support of
judgments."
HI.

A

PLEA IOR INTEGRITY IN ARGUMENT

But of course the ICC came under fierce attack even before
its judges rendered an opinion or its chief prosecutor was named.
U.S. officials and other critics have challenged the legitimacy of

the ICC on two principal grounds relating to its basic structure.
One challenge relies on a certain understanding of state sov-

ereignty. In brief, U.S. officials and other critics of the ICC assert that the Rome Statute violates basic tenets of international
law by allowing an international court to exercise jurisdiction
over nationals of states that have not adhered to the court's statute. In the interests of brevity, I will leave aside legal argu-

ments relating to ICC authority over nationals of non-consenting
states53 and simply say here that there has been a disturbing
dearth of intellectual honesty in the way this challenge has often

been framed.
For example, some U.S. critics claim or imply that international law has never countenanced the possibility of a treaty providing for jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states. 4 Yet
the United States has adhered to various treaties that do just
51 Cf

Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective

Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 318-23 (1997) (identifying the
quality of judicial reasoning as a key factor in the comparative success of supranational tribunals).
12 See, e.g., Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Remarks to the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, American Foreign Policy and the
InternationalCriminal Court (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/p/99
49pf.htm; David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 529, 532-33 (1999).
13 I have addressed this subject in Orentlicher, The Future of Universal Jurisdiction,
supra note 34; and Diane F. Orentlicher, Politics by Other Means: The Law of the
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 489 (1999).
'

For example, two writers breathlessly assert: "In an astonishing break with the
accepted norms of international law, the Rome treaty would extend the ICC's
jurisdiction to the citizens of countries that have not signed and ratified the
treaty." Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., The International Criminal Court
vs. The American People, The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1249, Feb.
5, 1999, at 2 [hereinafter Casey & Rivkin, ICC vs. American People].
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that. These include treaties dealing with war crimes,55 torture56

and terrorism. Each of these conventions requires states parties
to prosecute or extradite persons in their territory who are alleged to have committed defined offenses. These provisions apply regardless of the nationality of the suspect or the site of the
alleged crime.
This is not to suggest that the concerns underlying objections
to ICC jurisdiction over non-party states are wholly without

merit. 8 The point rather is that legitimate concerns relating to
the Rome Statute would be more persuasive to those who need
to be convinced if they were advanced without resort to hyperbole or misstatement.
The second key challenge focuses on issues of democratic

legitimacy. To some extent this challenge mirrors criticisms premised on sovereignty: Critics have charged that the ICC lacks
democratic legitimacy over nationals of states that have not accepted the court's authority.59 Another dimension of the democracy critique is the claim that the ICC is not sufficiently hedged
with the sort of checks and balances that constrain officials in

5 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386.
16 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, arts. 5 & 7, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
51See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res.

146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/36 (1979);
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, arts. 3(2) & 7, 28 U.S.T. 1975,
1979-81; Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, arts. IV & VII, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 1645-46, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, 108-09; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Sept. 23, 1971, arts. 5 & 7. 24 U.S.T. 564, 570-71.
5' The most sophisticated presentation of these concerns is in Madeline Morris,
High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (2001).
5 See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 52; Jeremy Rabkin, International Law vs. the
American Constitution - Something's Got to Give, THE NAT'L INTEREST 30, 35
(Spring 1999).
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democratic states ° Many worry as well that ICC judges will engage in expansive lawmaking from the bench by necessity - international crimes are defined with less precision than most national
crimes."
We must take very seriously indeed the need for safeguards

that ensure ICC accountability. But the United States government and its intellectual allies have diminished the persuasive
power of their arguments by overplaying their hand. For in-

stance, the United States is right to insist upon an accountable
prosecutor. But to say that the ICC prosecutor is largely unconstrained, as the U.S. government and its surrogates routinely
charge,62 is at best disingenuous. Thanks in large part to effective
U.S. negotiating in Rome, the ICC prosecutor is constrained by
multiple layers of institutional oversight.63

The unfortunate irony is that, by deploying disingenuous arguments, ICC skeptics diminish the quality of public debate

about their concerns and thereby undermine one of the most important constraints on the court's operation. Citizens who are
accurately informed about the ICC are far better equipped to
provide oversight than a public that has been fed a steady diet of
inaccurate and misleading claims.
The Bush administration has compounded these problems
by refusing even to participate in ICC-related meetings aimed at
See, e.g., Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 17, at 53-54; Henry A. Kissinger, The
Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction,80 FOREIGN AFF. 86, 90-91 (July/Aug. 2001).
6l See, e.g., Goldsmith & Krasner, supra note 17, at 53. This concern should be
tempered by the detailed elaboration of elements of offenses subject to ICC jurisdiction. See Report of the PreparatoryCommission for the InternationalCriminal
Court, Pt. II, Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, 7th Sess., U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000). The elements were adopted by the Assembly of
States Parties of the ICC during its first session in September 2002. See Assembly
of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminal Court, 1st Sess.,
Official Records, U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, Pt. 11(B) (2002).
6 See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 52 (asserting that the Bush administration believes "the ICC is an institution of unchecked power" and that "there was a refusal [in Rome] to constrain the Court's powers in any meaningful way"); Casey
& Rivkin, ICC vs. American People, supra note 54, at 3 ("the ICC treaty is an
unchecked invitation to abuse"); Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., Court
Dismissed: The ICC is a snare and a monstrosity-with no standing, NAT'L REV.,
Nov. 11, 2002 (asserting that the U.S. considers the Rome Statute "an open invitation to abuse by ambitious and/or biased prosecutors and judges").
6 See Marlise Simons, supra note 12; Diane F. Orentlicher, No Frankenstein's
Court, WASH. POST, July 31, 1998, at A25. See generally Scheffer, supra note 52.
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defining ground rules for the court, and has instead resorted to
strong-arm tactics to secure state-by-state immunity agreements
for U.S. citizens.' By all accounts, the latter have antagonized
allies who might readily accommodate reasonable U.S. concerns.65 Surely those concerns would receive a far more sympathetic hearing if they were framed with a deeper regard for the
perspectives of those who do not yet agree.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In closing, I would like to return to a theme I mentioned
earlier: the central importance in its own right of assessing the
ICC. The most effective insurance against abuse of discretion by
the ICC prosecutor and judges will come from the ongoing and
vigilant monitoring of the court's performance. Friends of the
court should not hesitate to cry foul when criticism is warranted.
As for those who oppose the court in principle, I would hope to
see at the very least a basic regard for responsible argumentation. The court will be strengthened by critical scrutiny-but not
by disingenuous charges and overwrought fears.
See Peter Slevin, U.S. Presses Allies on War Crimes Court; Aid Wielded in Push
for Immunity Pacts, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2002, at A12.
65 Resentment over U.S. opposition toward the Rome Statute and several other
'

treaties that enjoy strong support in Europe spilled over into, and aggravated,
disagreements between the United States and many European countries over
Iraq policy in 2002-03. See Josef Joffe, Continental Divides, NAT'L INTEREST,
Spring 2003; J.F.O. McAllister, Mad at America, Time Magazine, Jan. 20, 2003.

